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A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism
abstract: This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the
mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of
conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of
our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent
value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever.
Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that
the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects possessing inherent value—
are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective
evidence.
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1. Introduction
The mind is whatever is ultimately bearing our conscious experiences. Substance
dualism is the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. In what follows, I am
going to argue that our moral intuitions about the inherent value of our minds
strongly imply that our minds are nonphysical objects.
First, I will clarify what substance dualism of the kind I am seeking to support
here involves. Second, I will outline a few assumptions I will be making about
morality. Third, I will say something about moral intuitions. Fourth, I will present
the moral argument. Finally, I will consider some objections before concluding.
2. Substance Dualism
There is no uncontroversial definition of a physical object. However, we have a
pre-theoretical understanding of the concept that proposed definitions are trying,
at least approximately, to capture. For instance, my mug is a physical object, and
it is currently inside my house, which is also a physical object. However, there
are serious limits to what my mug can be inside. It cannot be inside—wholly
inside—something smaller than it or inside something solid. Yet, the kind of object
our moral intuitions imply is bearing our conscious experiences is one apparently
capable of existing inside any other thing at all and all by itself. So, it is a kind of
object that has no size or mass. It seems no abuse of the term to describe such an
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object as nonphysical. Thus, if I am correct, our moral intuitions imply that our
minds are nonphysical objects in this pretheoretical sense.
3. Moral Assumptions
I am going to have tomake a few assumptions about morality. These are not entirely
uncontroversial (that would be nigh on impossible). However, they are widely
endorsed and are less controversial than their alternatives. The first assumption is
ethical realism. This is the combination of two claims. The first claim is that the truth
or falsity of an ethical claim is not constitutively determined by anyone’s feelings
or beliefs about it.1 The second claim is that at least some ethical propositions
are true. That is to say, it is not just that there appears to be an objective ethical
dimension to the universe. There actually is one.
We might think of the moral landscape as being in some ways analogous to
the physical one. Our five senses give us the impression of an objective physical
landscape, but the sense impressions do not compose it. Similarly, most of us get
the impression, via what tend to be termed ‘moral intuitions’ (about which more
shortly), of an ethical landscape. However, moral intuitions do not compose the
ethical landscape. Moral intuitions are a kind of appearance. They represent there
to be an objective moral dimension, just as our sense reports represent there to
be an objective physical dimension.
Some claim that moral intuitions are actually a species of belief, distinct from the
others in that they are justified by our understanding their propositional contents
(Audi 2004: 33–36).2 It does not really matter to my case if one construes them as
such, for I think my case could still be made with small adjustment. However, I am
going to stick with construing moral intuitions as appearances because that is what
they appear to me to be. Just as sometimes things appear visually to be a certain
way (the stick in the water appears bent), but I do not believe what seems to be the
case, so too sometimes something appears intuitively wrong; yet, I do not believe
it to be wrong. The intelligibility of such statements suggests that moral intuitions
and moral beliefs are different sorts of mental states. In this respect I follow others,
such as Huemer (2005) and Killoren (2010: 2, fn. 1).
Another assumption I will be making is reliable access. I assume that my five
senses providemewith fairly reliable (though far from perfect) access to the physical
dimension. I am going to assume that moral intuitions provide us with fairly reliable
access to the ethical dimension.
1So, this excludes subjectivist views (according to which moral claims describe attitudes) and expressivist
views (according to which moral claims express attitudes), such as those held by Mark Timmons (1999) Allan
Gibbard (1990) and Simon Blackburn (1993). Also excluded are ideal observer views according to which moral
claims are truth-apt but their truthmakers are the attitudes of idealized agents (Smith 1994).
2Let me also add that as I prepare this final draft there has appeared in this journal an article by Robert
Audi (“Intuition and its Place in Ethics”) in which he provides a careful and insightful account of moral intuition
(Audi 2015). I have yet properly to digest it, but I think the kind of intuition that I will be talking about would
be classified as ‘episodic’ by Audi.
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Some of what I have said above might make it sound as if I am assuming our
faculty of moral intuition to be a sixth sense. We do sometimes talk of a ‘moral
sense’. However, such talk should not be taken literally. For instance, no one thinks
we can, by moral intuition, detect whether we are being lied to, or whether there is
an innocent in the building we are proposing to destroy. The manner in which our
moral intuitions give us insight into the ethical differs in an important way from
how our sensory appearances give us access to the physical. I will say more about
this in the next section.
4. Intuitions
Not everything we know about the universe derives from the reports of our five
senses. For instance, does the universe contain any objects that are red all over and
green all over at the same time? No, it seems clear to most of us that it does not. But
how do we know that? It is implausible to suggest that it is just because we have
never seen any such things. It appears necessarily to be true that there aren’t any.
By contrast it appears merely contingently true that, say, there are no unicorns.
Unicorns could ‘in principle’ exist and searching for some is not wholly misguided
in the way that looking for some simultaneously red and green things does seem to
be.
Some might propose that the claim that ‘nothing can be red all over and green
all over at the same time’ is true by definition. But as Huemer points out:
It is not enough just to make this kind of claim; to make good on it, the
empiricist must produce the definitions of ‘red’ and ‘green’ together with
the actual derivation, from those definitions, of the statement ‘Nothing
can be both red and green’. No one has done this; indeed, the whole
project seems stymied at stage one by the absence of any analytical
definition of either ‘red’ or ‘green’. It is here that some are tempted to
appeal to scientific knowledge about the underlying nature of colors
to construct definitions (saying, for example, ‘red is the disposition to
reflect such-and-such wavelengths of light’). But this approach leads to
the absurd consequence that, say, 300 years ago, people were in no
position to know whether it was possible for a red object to be green—
indeed, did not even understand the meanings of those words—since
they did not know the scientific theory of colors. (2005: 112–13)
It seems, then, that it is not by sight, sound, smell, taste, or hearing that we
know there are no simultaneously green and red objects. Rather, we know this by
intuition: rational intuition.
We intuit a lot. We intuit that if we are thirsty and the mug in front of us
contains water, then we have some reason to take a drink from it. We do not see
such reasons with our eyes or hear them or taste, smell, or bump into them. It
is not that we do not know what they look like or feel like. Rather, normative
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reasons (reasons to do and believe things) are just not in the looking-a-way or
feeling-a-way business. That is to say, they appear positively to be textureless,
shapeless, colorless, soundless, and tasteless. We do not sense their presence; we
intuit it.
Note that all intellectual inquiry presupposes that there are reasons to believe
things—and so assumes that there is a normative dimension to the universe—for
evidence in support of a proposition just is a consideration that provides a reason
to believe something. As Huemer puts it:
Intuitions are not some exotic, theoretical entities invented by a few
philosophers. They do not merely play someminor, recherche´ role, such
that we could excise them and our intellectual life would go on pretty
much the way it does now. Nor is there some alternative, intuition-
independent methodology being implemented by some other group of
philosophers. (2005: 119)
To forestall possible misunderstandings, note that there is no suggestion—no
suggestion in anything I have said above, anyway—that intuitions are infallible.
I have suggested that intuitions give us insight into necessary truths about the
universe. 3 By definition, it is not possible for a necessary truth to be false. But it is
possible for an intuition to be inaccurate. So, it is possible for something to appear
to be a necessary truth, yet not be one. The difference (in part anyway) between
rational intuitions and sense reports seems to concern the nature of the truths they
give us insight into, rather than their reliability. That is why we have to build our
theories of everything carefully, attempting to achieve a best overall systemization
of our clearest, widely corroborated sense impressions and rational intuitions.
Note also that there is no suggestion that if something is necessarily true, we
will intuit it to be so. There are, we are told, colors it is beyond our faculty of
sight to detect. By the same token, perhaps there are many necessary truths beyond
intuitive detection. Thus, although intuitions provide insight into necessary truths
about the universe, there is no special reason to think they do so with total accuracy
or comprehensively.
To get back to morality: virtually all moral realists hold that moral truths are
among the necessary truths about our universe (see Coons 2011; Huemer 2005:
122; Murphy 2011: 36–37). It is not just that Xing in circumstances S at time T
happens to be wrong. It is necessarily wrong, if it is wrong at all. And so, as with
other necessary truths, we know of moral truths not by sight or sound, touch, taste,
or smell, but by intuition.
3Perhaps intuitions just provide insight into a different range of contingent truths, rather than necessary
truths. In other words, perhaps it is just true that if I desire a drink and the cup contains water I have reason
to take a sip, rather than necessarily true. If this is so, it would not really harm my case. It would mean that
our moral intuitions imply that it is just true that our conscious experiences are being borne by something
nonphysical, as opposed to implying that it is necessarily true. However, I am going to stick with assuming
intuitions provide insight into necessary truths simply because most contemporary moral realists assume that
moral truths are necessary truths.
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As already noted, we cannot by moral intuition detect if we are being lied to
or if there is an innocent person in the building we’re about to demolish. These
are contingent matters. But we can tell by moral intuition that if we are being
lied to in such-and-such circumstances, then we are necessarily being wronged, or
if the building has an innocent person in it, then it would be necessarily wrong
to demolish it. We might usefully picture our faculty of moral intuition (and our
faculty of rational intuition more generally, though I will focus just on moral
intuitions in the remainder) as a kind of crackly phone line to an ethical help desk
(a help desk within the larger Reason Inc.). The operators have information about
what is necessarily true, including the necessary connections that exist between the
nonmoral andmoral. But they have no information about what is contingently true.
That is information we must provide on every occasion. As with most help desks,
not all operators are well-trained or competent, and the lines aren’t always clear.
Nevertheless, clear, confident replies that are widely corroborated by what other
people’s help desk operators say about similar cases have considerable probative
force.
Sometimes our help desk operators give us no clear response. This is where
thought experiments are useful. In a thought experiment we describe a hypothetical
situation to our help desk operators, one that seems in some ways similar to the
case at hand and about which we hope to get a clearer response. Note, the fact the
verdict is about an imaginary case should not, in principle anyway, make any real
difference to the reliability of the response. For the ethical help desk operators do
not have any information about contingent truths beyond what we tell them on any
given occasion. Thus, other things being equal, what they tell us about imaginary
cases will be just as reliable as what they tell us about actual cases. Of course, we
may have difficulty properly and vividly representing an imaginary situation, but
that’s what the ‘other things being equal’ clause is in there to cover.
In summary, then, moral intuitions are a species of rational intuition that, like
other rational intuitions, provide us with fairly reliable (but far from perfect or
comprehensive) insight into necessary truths about the universe. And, other things
being equal, moral intuitions about thought experiments are just as reliable a source
of insight into such necessary truths as moral intuitions about actual cases.
5. Subjects and Inherent Value
We are bearers of conscious experiences, of feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and
memories. Most of us have the powerful moral intuition that we have moral
value, that is to say, we are owed a degree of respect and good will from others.
Furthermore, it is intuitively obvious to most of us that this moral value is not
wholly determined by the value of the conscious experiences we are undergoing.
This is not to claim that ourmoral value cannot be affected by the kinds of conscious
experience we are undergoing. Someone who thinks nasty thoughts, wills nasty
ends, and so on can perhaps come to be worth less than someone who does not.
The point remains, however, that we need already to have some moral value in
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order that the presence of certain conscious experiences in us can subsequently
diminish it.
Of course, conscious experiences—many of them—are morally valuable.
Pleasure is normally morally valuable. However, intuitively our moral value does
not go up and down according to how much pleasure we are undergoing. I did not
become slightly less deserving of respect when I stubbed my toe this morning, and
I do not cease to be morally valuable when I am unconscious. So, morally speaking
it appears—and appears very strongly to virtually all of us—that we, bearers of
conscious experiences, have a moral value that is not constitutively determined
by the value of the conscious experiences we are undergoing. In other words,
our intuitions—our ethical help desk operators—tell us that if we are bearers of
conscious experiences, then we, the objects bearing such things, have a moral value
that is independent of the value of those experiences. We, the minds, the containers
of conscious experiences, have inherent moral value (I take the term ‘inherent value’
from Regan 1983).
Exactly how much inherent moral value we have, what else can or cannot
contribute to our moral value, how to show respect for that value, what to do
in conflict situations, and to what extent our overall value can be diminished by
what we do and undergo are fiendishly complicated matters. Thankfully, these are
all issues that can be left open here. All that matters for my purposes is that it is
intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have a significant
inherent moral value.
In fact, even less than this is required. For some may hold that not all bearers
of conscious experiences have inherent value (or much inherent value). Perhaps it
is only persons capable of bearing certain sorts of conscious experiences that have
significant inherent value, whereas those not capable of doing so either have no
inherent value or have considerably less. Again, this is a matter we can put to one
side, for my argument does not require us to take a stand. All that is needed for
my case to stand up is the intuition that bearers of at least some kinds of conscious
experiences have a significant inherent value, a value that is not reducible to the
value of those experiences. Nevertheless, for ease of argument, I will talk just of
bearers of any conscious experiences having significant inherent moral value.
Given that moral intuitions provide insight into necessary truths about the
universe, it would seem that it is a necessary truth that bearers of conscious
experiences have inherent value. This implies it is a necessary truth that conscious
experiences are being borne by a particular kind of object, one the help desk
operators know to have a significant value that is not reducible to those experiences.
Therefore, it would appear to be a necessary truth that conscious experiences are
borne by a particular kind of thing and a necessary truth that such things have
significant inherent moral value.
Nothing said so far implies that the ultimate bearer of our conscious experiences
is a nonphysical thing. Perhaps it is a necessary truth that conscious experiences
are borne by complicated lumps of electrified meat and that complicated lumps of
electrified meat have significant inherent value. Thus, when we phone operators
and tell them that we are undergoing conscious experiences, they know that we
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must be a complicated lump of electrified meat and know that such things have
inherent moral value.
But now engage in the following thought experiment. Imagine you have no
physical body whatsoever. When you look down, you see nothing. When you
look into a mirror, you see nothing reflected back apart from the wall behind you.
Moreover, you find that you can glide throughwalls and other physical obstructions
and no one else can detect your existence by any of the five standard senses. In other
words, imagine finding that your conscious experiences are not being borne by any
physical body at all. Represent this possibility to an ethical operator. What does
he/she say? In other words, what are our moral intuitions about our moral worth if
it should turn out that we lack anything that might, pretheoretically, be described
as a physical body?
The operators at the help desk say (with as much confidence as ever) that if that
truly is our situation, we still have inherent value. It appears intuitively obvious that
even if what I have been taking to be my body is a clever hologram, I am still owed
the same degree of good will, respect, and so on. If my body is a hologram, it is
still wrong for you to fail to fulfill your promises to me or to speak ill of me behind
my back. Just as my inherent moral value does not go up or down according to
whether I am miserable or happy, it does not go up or down according to whether
I have a physical body or not. Someone who held otherwise would be guilty of
what might be termed ‘bodyism’. So, our moral intuitions tell us, loud and clear,
that we have inherent moral worth irrespective of whether we possess a physical
body. This, I hold, strongly implies that we, the bearers of inherent value, are not
physical bodies.
It might be objected that the apparent irrelevance of an object’s shape, size, and
color to its possession of mass does not entail that the possessor of mass lacks color,
shape, and size. And so, by extension the apparent moral irrelevance of our mind’s
shape, size, and color does not entail that the mind lacks a shape, size, and color.4
In reply, first note that the thought experiment above implies that it is irrelevant
whether we—the objects bearing inherent value—even have a shape, size, mass, or
color at all, not just what shape, color, or size we have. This still does not entail
that our minds lack such things (which is just as well, for if it turns out that our
conscious experiences are being borne by physical things, we do not want to be
forced to have to reject our intuitions about our inherent moral value), but it does
strongly imply it.
Consider: if it was a necessary truth that conscious experiences are borne by
physical objects of some sort, then upon representing ourselves to have no physical
bodies whatsoever one would predict unclear, wavering, confused replies from our
ethical operators. From their perspective, we would have told them is that an object
with inherent value is present and not present at the same time. However, our moral
intuitions are clear, confident, and unwavering. That is, our moral intuitions are
telling us, loud and clear, that it is not a necessary truth that conscious experiences
are borne by physical objects.
4Thanks to a reviewer for pressing me to clarify this.
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It still remains possible, consistent with our moral intuitions being what they
are, that our conscious experiences are being borne by something physical. For it
could be a necessary truth about conscious experiences that they are either borne
by a certain sort of physical object or by a nonphysical object, and the inherent
moral value of both happens, coincidentally, to be exactly the same. Or it could be
that the value-conferring property is ‘being an object capable of being the ultimate
bearer of conscious experiences’, a property that might be possessed by brains and
nonphysical objects alike. If this were the case, then we would have an explanation
of why our ethical operators are indifferent to whether we represent ourselves to
have a body or not. Yet, other things being equal, these are not the most reasonable
explanations of our moral intuitions.
Imagine a detective at a crime scene proposing that the trail of bloody footprints
leading away from Janet’s body were left by two assailants who, coincidentally,
were wearing exactly the same sorts of shoes and walking in each other’s footsteps.
This is possible, but absent powerful independent reason to think that there were
two assailants, it is not a reasonable thesis. Likewise, the most straightforward
explanation of our moral intuitions about the inherent moral value of our
minds is that there is one kind of object that can bear conscious experiences—
a nonphysical one—and that it is necessarily true that such objects have significant
inherent value. Proposing that there are two kinds of object capable of bearing
conscious experiences—brains and nonphysical objects—would be an ad hoc and
unnecessarily baroque explanation of our moral intuitions. It is simpler to propose
that our ethical operators are indifferent to whether we represent ourselves to
have a body or not because they know that the kind of thing that bears conscious
experiences is one the presence of which is compatible with us possessing a body
and also compatible with us not possessing a body. Thus, other things being equal,
our moral intuitions provide prima facie evidence that conscious experiences are
borne by a nonphysical object and that it is a necessary truth that this sort of object
has significant inherent moral value.
For an analogy: take the debate over the kind of control needed for morally
responsible agency. Suppose we could find an uncontroversial way of representing
causal determinism to be true and an uncontroversial way of representing causal
indeterminism to be true. Imagine we find that our moral intuitions about an agent’s
moral responsibility remain the same for both representations. That is to say, our
ethical help desk operators appear indifferent to whether we have represented
determinism as true or false. Virtually everyone would take this to be powerful
evidence that the kind of control necessary for moral responsibility is of a sort that
is compatible with determinism and indeterminism. Our moral intuitions cannot
tell us whether determinism or indeterminism is true, but they can tell us that it
does not matter. Note that, other things being equal, it would not be reasonable to
conclude that there are two quite different sorts of control that happen to be equally
sufficient for responsible agency, with one requiring determinism and the other
requiring indeterminism (and thus that determinism provides one but precludes the
other and vice versa). This would be consistent with our moral intuitions, but it
would be a perversely baroque explanation of them.
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Likewise, our moral intuitions about our inherent value and their indifference
to whether we represent ourselves to have a body or not imply that the kind of
object that bears our conscious experiences is of a sort that is compatible with our
having a physical body and also compatible with our not having one. And we can
represent ourselves to have any kind of body whatever, no matter how big or small,
or no body at all, and our intuitions remain the same. Our moral intuitions thus
imply that the kind of object that bears conscious experiences can be inside any
kind of physical body whatever or can exist by itself. Pretheoretically, an object
like that seems to qualify as nonphysical. Thus, our moral intuitions are implying
that we, bearers of conscious experiences, are such objects.
At this point it might be objected that even if we have clear moral intuitions
about a situation, this does not establish that the situation involves something
metaphysically possible. For instance, clear moral intuitions about what to do in a
situation involving backward time travel would not establish that backward time
travel is metaphysically possible. So why should intuitions about bodiless bearers
of conscious experiences be taken to imply that it is metaphysically possible (and
actual) that the bearers of our conscious experiences are nonphysical objects?
In reply I would point out that my argument does not assume that clear moral
intuitions about a case automatically imply that the case represents ametaphysically
possible situation. Moral intuitions tell us about the morally relevant features of
a situation. They are moral intuitions. It is an ethical help desk. Accordingly, a
situation in which all morally relevant features are coherently represented should
continue to elicit clear moral intuitions even if the morally irrelevant features could
not possibly obtain. If we represent to our faculty of moral intuition a scenario
we have independent reason to think could not possibly obtain—such as one
involving backward time travel—and it continues to elicit clear moral intuitions,
this implies not that backward time travel is metaphysically possible, but that the
temporal location of an act is morally irrelevant (or alternatively, that our moral
intuitions can only provide insight into the moral lay of the land at the present
time). By contrast, it is obviously morally relevant what kind of object is bearing
our conscious experiences for it bears inherent moral value.
In summary, our moral intuitions imply that our conscious experiences are
ultimately borne by a nonphysical thing: a thing that can be inside any physical
thing whatsoever (for it does not seem to matter what kind of physical thing you
represent your conscious experiences as being inside); yet, this thing can also exist
entirely by itself.
6. Objections
I anticipate two general kinds of objection. The first takes issue with the strength
of moral evidence, holding that moral evidence is very weak evidence or not really
‘evidence’ at all. The second line of objection holds that there are strong independent
reasons to think substance dualism is false and that these easily outweigh any
positive case provided by our moral intuitions.
Obviously, there is a real limit to what I can say in response to such general
criticisms. But with regard to the first: why think moral evidence is weak evidence?
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The clear and widely shared intuition that nothing can be simultaneously green
all over and red all over is powerful evidence that there is nothing simultaneously
green all over and red all over in the universe. The clear and widely shared intuition
that if I am thirsty and the glass in front of me contains water, then I have some
reason to take a drink from it is powerful evidence that this is indeed the case.
On the face of it, there is no reason to treat moral intuitions—clear, widely shared
ones—any differently.
It might be objected that divergent moral intuitions across time and space
call into question their reliability. In reply I stress that I am talking about clear
and widely corroborated moral intuitions. Our moral intuitions about our own
inherent value are of this sort. I suggest that these intuitions are very stable across
time and space, even if moral intuitions about our overall value and the relevance
of other factors have not been that stable. If resisting my argument requires
challenging the reliability of even our most clear and widely corroborated moral
intuitions, then it is a strong argument because resisting it requires embracing a
very radical moral skepticism.
Second, it is not obvious to what extent divergent moral intuitions across time
and space really do call into question the reliability of moral intuition. For instance,
as far as I can tell there is nothing in moral realism per se that commits one to a
fixed, uniform moral landscape. Neither the moral supervenience thesis (if two
acts have all the same nonmoral properties, they must also have the same moral
properties) nor the universalizability thesis (if two acts are similar in all morally
relevant respects, they must have the same morality) entail it, for neither says
anything about which features of an act are morally relevant, and thus both leave
open that an act’s temporal and spatial properties could be relevant.
The objectivity of morality does not imply a fixed, uniform landscape either, for
the physical landscape is objective yet varies over time and space. So why can’t the
moral landscape vary as well? Indeed, would not positive evidence that the moral
landscape varies over time and space consist in divergent moral intuitions careful,
reflective people had over time and space? Divergent moral intuitions may just be
indicative of a varying moral landscape. In other words, even if moral intuitions
about our inherent value have varied over time (and/or space), this would not
necessarily call into question the reliability of those intuitions at any given time
and place and thus would not undermine the force of my argument. Our moral
intuitions imply that it is necessarily the case that conscious experiences are borne
by nonphysical objects and that at this time and place such objects have significant
inherent moral value.
It might be objected that there is good reason to discount the evidence of all
moral intuitions for the best overall explanation of why the universe appears to us
to have a moral dimension is that getting such impressions enabled our ancestors
to make more babies and rear them more successfully than those who got no
such impressions (see Joyce 2006: 2). By contrast, the best explanation of why we
see trees and mountains is that there is an actual physical world out there, and
seeing it at least approximately accurately helped our ancestors make babies more
successfully than those who could not. In other words, we can explain the existence
of moral intuitions without having to posit an actual moral dimension answering
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to them (and so, on grounds of simplicity, should not posit one). Whereas when
it comes to sense impressions, their adaptive value comes from them being at least
approximately accurate representations of a real physical world.
Obviously, I cannot consider the credibility of the above case for moral nihilism
in any detail. But rejecting my moral argument for substance dualism by embracing
moral nihilism is, to say the least, a dramatic way of resisting it. Second, it seems
inevitable that any argument for moral nihilism is going to have at least one premise
that is prima facie less plausible than the claim that there is something wrong with,
say, raping an innocent. Third, it is hard to see how to stop an argument for
moral nihilism ending up challenging the reality of the entire normative dimension
of the universe. For instance, having true beliefs and adopting methods of belief
formation likely to result in these would seem to have considerable adaptive value.
But it is the truth of such beliefs—and the tendency of such methods to yield true
beliefs—that confers the advantage, not the existence of reasons to believe and
adopt those beliefs. It would seem, then, that there do not actually need to be any
epistemic reasons in reality in order for the advantage to accrue: it is enough that
we get the strong impression that there are and take such impressions seriously.
Yet, all intellectual inquiry presupposes that there is a normative dimension to
the universe, for epistemic reasons are normative reasons. If this is correct, then
any argument for moral nihilism is going ultimately to be ad hoc (singling out
morality for debunking but arbitrarily leaving the rest of the normative landscape
untouched) or self-stultifying. Obviously, what I have just said above requires more
detailed argument than I can provide here, but the more general point I am trying
to illustrate is that the plausibility both of moral skepticism and moral nihilism
remains very much in question and hardly affords one a reliable base from which
to attack a moral argument for substance dualism (or a moral case for anything
else, for that matter).
The critic may instead target moral objectivism, arguing that moral claims are
not truth-apt. They are not about the world, as such, but are rather expressions
of attitude or intent. My reply must be brief, so I will just note that this objection
involves adopting a minority metaethical stance, widely recognized to be riven with
problems that many of us—myself included—consider insurmountable.
Now for the second objection that despite the strength of any moral case for
substance dualism there are overall more powerful reasons to reject substance
dualism. Again, considering this objection in detail would require careful scrutiny
of all the arguments in question. However, let me just say that I think the case
against substance dualism is at present greatly overstated (for some good criticisms
of the standard objections to substance dualism, see Rodrigues 2014).
Consider one of the most popular ‘problems’ that substance dualism is supposed
to face: the problem of interaction. According to this objection, two things of a
fundamentally different nature cannot interact. Given that substance dualism has
it that the mind is a fundamentally different kind of thing from any physical thing,
it follows that minds cannot interact with the physical world. As minds clearly can
interact with the physical world, substance dualism must be false. The ultimate
bearers of our conscious experiences must be physical.
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But ahead of investigation, what possible reason is there to think two radically
different sorts of things cannot interact? One might ask ‘how can they?’ But not
knowing how something might be the case is not evidence that it is not, or cannot,
be the case. I haven’t a clue how my computer works. That is not evidence that it
isn’t working! One might raise the same question about things of the same kind.
As Rodrigues puts it:
What is it about immaterial minds that you think makes it harder to
enter in causal relationships with physical objects? What is it about
causality that makes problematic interaction between different sorts of
things? After all, physics gives us numerous examples of very different
things interacting with each other: fields and particles, singularities,
black holes, forces and charges, etc. (2014: 214)
Ahead of investigation there is no reason to think that radically different sorts of
things cannot interact. I have done some investigating above and noticed that moral
appearances strongly imply that our minds are not physical things. It also appears
that minds can and do interact with the physical. So, upon investigation it appears
that radically dissimilar things can and do interact.
Finally, it should be noted that the moral evidence I have presented above is
not the only positive evidence for substance dualism there is. There is introspective
evidence as well. I suppose I can claim to be an authority on how things appear
to me. Personally, I do not just get the impression that there are conscious
experiences occurring somewhere inside my head. I get the impression—a mind’s-
eye impression—that they are being borne by an object (I call it ‘me’). And this
object that appears to be bearing my conscious experiences appears to be inside
my head, but positively to be shapeless, sizeless, and colorless. It does not appear
to be my brain. Perhaps my brain is, in fact, the ultimate bearer of my conscious
experiences. But if that is true, then what appears to me to be bearing my conscious
experiences is not bearing them.
Appearances are prima facie evidence for what they represent to be the case, and
thus the appearance—the mind’s eye impression—that my conscious experiences
are being borne by a nonphysical thing that is inside my head is prima facie evidence
that they are.
Water is often wheeled in (or poured in) at this point. Water appears to be a
colorless, wet liquid, but upon careful investigation it is found to be a collection
of tiny molecules. So could not the appearance of the sizeless, colorless, textureless
object bearing my conscious experiences turn out to be my brain, just as water
turns out to be huge collections of tiny molecules?
The analogy is strained, to say the least. As Huemer puts it:
On the face of it, water doesn’t seem to be H2O; but it is not the case
that water seems to not be H2O. Our prescientific concept of water
takes it to be a clear, odorless, tasteless, etc., liquid. We cannot, on the
basis of this concept, discern anything about what its micro-structure
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might be like. We have no experience of just seeing that there are no
tiny particles composing it, and so on. Nor do we have the sense that
water is a different category of thing from H2O; on the contrary, we see
that they are the same category of thing, namely, physical substances.
(2005: 94–95)
Forget tiny molecules for a moment. Could water turn out to be made of practical
reasons? No. Indeed, someone who thought it possible that water might turn out
to be made of practical reasons is someone we would have to say either had no
idea what water is or no idea what practical reasons are (or both). Water has a
size, a shape, texture; practical reasons have none of these things. We do not need
to know any more about what practical reasons are, in and of themselves, or know
more about what water is, in and of itself, to know that water cannot be made of
practical reasons (or vice versa). They are just too radically dissimilar. I would say
that the same is true of the object that appears to me to be bearing my conscious
experiences. It appears positively to be shapeless, colorless, and sizeless. A brain
is as radically dissimilar to the thing that appears to be bearing my conscious
experiences as practical reasons are radically dissimilar to water. What it would
take for the appearance to be accurate is the presence in my head of a shapeless,
colorless, sizeless thing. Perhaps there is not one in there, but there would jolly well
need to be one if the appearance is to qualify as anything other than an illusion.
Perhaps others do not get the impression of a nonphysical thing bearing their
conscious experiences. Hume said he didn’t. He said that ‘when I enter most
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception
or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never
can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything
but the perception’ ([1739/40]1978: 252). But Hume does not speak for everyone.
As most introductions to the philosophy of mind are wont to point out: substance
dualism is very popular among nonphilosophers (Churchland 1996: 7). Surely, the
best explanation of this is not that most people have read and been impressed by
the arguments of Descartes or Plato, but that substance dualism describes, at least
roughly, how things appear to a great many people?
Also, consider this. As we all know, sensory faculties malfunction from time to
time. That is, if there do appear to many of us to be positively shapeless, sizeless,
colorless things inside our heads, we would also expect there to be hallucinations
of such things, just as there are hallucinatory visual appearances and so on. We
would expect there might be ‘sightings’ of positively shapeless, sizeless, colorless
things outside of our heads, at least from time to time.
There are such sightings. Lots of them. Appearances of ghosts, spirits, presences,
call them what you will, are and have been regularly and consistently reported
throughout the history of humankind (they are not culturally specific). In fact,
anecdotally many people—perhaps most—have had some sort of experience of
a ‘presence’ from time to time. Most of us just do not take them remotely
seriously. For instance, I am prey to such appearances when I am very sleep
deprived. I have found that after a prolonged period without sleep, I start to
get the distinct impression someone has come into the room, despite not seeing or
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hearing anyone (note, I don’t believe there is anyone in the room with me: I believe
I am malfunctioning and promptly go to bed!). Here is William Golding describing
a character undergoing such an experience in his book The Spire:
And then, quite suddenly, he knew he was not alone. It was not that
he saw, or heard a presence. He felt it, like the warmth of a fire at his
back, powerful and gentle at the same time; and so immediate was the
pressure of that personality, it might have been in his very spine. (1965:
22)
These are not impressions of bundles of free floating conscious experiences. They
are appearances of objects, bearers of conscious experiences.
I want to stress that I am not arguing that ghostly presences—disembodied
minds—exist. I am arguing that impressions that ghostly presences exist, exist.
When we get the impression of such things outside our own heads, we call them
presences, spirits, ghosts. Most of us, quite sensibly, consider that such appearances
constitute illusions.
Perhaps the appearance of a nonphysical thing inside our own heads constitutes
an illusion as well. However, speaking personally, I only start getting the impression
of external bodiless presences in extreme circumstances—when I have gone for an
unusually long time without sleep—under which I would positively expect to start
coming unhooked from reality in some way. By contrast, I get the impression
that there is a positively shapeless, sizeless, colorless thing inside my own head
all the time. I am getting it right now. There does not seem to be any special
reason for me to consider that these appearances constitute illusions. As such,
the appearance—occurring under ordinary circumstances—of positively shapeless,
sizeless, textureless, colorless objects bearing our conscious experiences inside our
heads constitutes prima facie evidence that there are such things inside our heads.
Not decisive evidence, of course, but significantly evidence that is corroborated by
the moral evidence.
7. Conclusion
My object here has been to draw attention to powerful moral evidence in support of
a version of substance dualism about the mind. We have clear, widely corroborated
moral intuitions about the value of bearers of conscious experiences: a value that
does not derive from the value of the conscious experiences themselves. Among
moral realists, moral truths are almost universally held to be necessary truths about
our universe. Our moral intuitions provide us with (fallible) insight into what those
necessary truths may be. As such, our moral intuitions imply that it is a necessary
truth that conscious experiences are borne by a nonphysical thing and that these
nonphysical things have significant inherent moral value.
Some hold that moral evidence is not good evidence. But it is hard to make
good on that claim. Some may hold that there are good independent reasons for
thinking substance dualism is false and that these reasons are powerful enough
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to overcome any moral evidence there may be. But this is not true, or at least it
is highly questionable. Indeed, if anything, there seem to be independent reasons
to think substance dualism is true. To many of us substance dualism appears to
be true: our conscious experiences appear to us—to our mind’s eye—to be being
borne by something radically dissimilar to the brain. This is prima facie evidence
that they are being borne by something radically dissimilar to the brain, evidence
corroborated by the moral evidence I have provided above. If correct, then at
least two witnesses whose testimony we have no special reason to distrust, place
substance dualism at the crime scene.
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